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ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE SOLELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE WAS SO INCONCLUSIVE AS TO REQUIRE 
IMPERMISSIBLE SPECULATION, AND DID NOT EXCLUDE 
ALL REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
The State argues generally that the jury made reasonable inferences from the 
evidence in this case, and did not impermissibly speculate. However, the State then 
constructs a theoretical chain of possible inferences which unwittingly demonstrates the 
very type of speculation the jury must necessarily have indulged in to return a 
conviction against Dr. Lyman. There are numerous assumptions, reliance on "facts" 
not in evidence, and inferential leaps across evidentiary gaps. For example, the State 
infers that Dr. Lyman removed the missing equipment from the Fitness Center in a 
duffel bag. (State's Brief at 20.) In fact, there is not a shred of evidence that any 
witness ever saw Dr. Lyman remove anything from the Fitness Center, nor even saw 
him in possession of any kind of duffel bag on April 6, 1996. (Record, pp. 1201.) 
Rather, the 'removal-in-a-duffel-bag' scenario is no more than rank speculation from 
testimony that Dr. Lyman had typically used a "workout bag" a year and a half earlier. 
(Record, pp. 1177,1201.) 
The only evidence at the time of Dr. Lyman's motion for judgment of acquittal-all 
circumstantial-was that Dr. Lyman had been at the Fitness Center, had entered the 
unlocked utility closet briefly while talking with Chris Delahunty about carpet repairs 
(but had not closed the door behind him), and had asked to borrow a putty knife from 
Chris Delahunty while holding a bucket of joint compound.1 As argued in Defendant's 
opening brief, and as stated by the trial court, these actions are as consistent with 
lawful conduct as with criminal conduct. 
The State claims that Defendant has not provided a reasonable alternative 
hypothesis to the allegations of theft. (State's brief at 23.) Of course, the burden was 
not on the Defendant to prove his innocence. Rather, the burden remained on the 
State to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. 
Moreover, Dr. Lyman did provide a reasonable alternative hypothesis, and it is 
simple-he was doing maintenance work at the Fitness Center, just as he routinely did 
every weekend. (Record, pp.1306.) 
It is significant, and indicative of the glaring deficiencies in the evidentiary trial 
record, that this and other reasonable hypotheses were not excluded by the 
circumstantial evidence presented by the State. As this Court recently reaffirmed in 
State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998): 
[Wjhere the only evidence presented against the defendant 
is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is 
because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of 
1
 The State's brief also reviews the testimony of Colleen Lyman as part of the 
evidentiary record. However, Defendant seeks review of the trial court's denial of his 
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, so her testimony is not 
relevant to this appeal. 
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innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt. 
i d at 786 (citations omitted). Thus, on appeal, "[even] considering the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the [verdict]", the role of 
the appellate court is to "review the evidence to determine whether it excludes all 
reasonable hypotheses of [the defendant's] innocence", i d at 787. 
In Layman, the defendant's convictions for possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute and possession of paraphernalia were reversed. The controlled 
substance and paraphernalia were on the person of a passenger in defendant's 
vehicle. The basis for defendant's convictions was his presence, his allegedly 
incriminating conduct (shaking his head) at the time of the traffic stop, and his drug use 
as evidenced by drugs in his system at the time. The Court found this circumstantial 
evidence insufficient: ". . JNjeither possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for 
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt... 'Criminal convictions may not be based upon 
conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported 
by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which 
the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'. . . 'Strong 
suspicions or mere probabilities are not sufficient.'" Id at 792 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
As in Layman, the State's case was constructed with nothing but "'an inference 
upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture not justifying a conclusion that [guilt 
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had been proven] beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any [other] 
reasonable hypothesis."' k l at 787 (citations omitted). In this case, there was not a 
quantum of evidence that Dr. Lyman either repaired the slit in question or stole the 
surveillance equipment. Even if the jury made the speculative leap from Dr. Lyman's 
possession of a spackling knife to the conjecture that he may have spackled the slit in 
the maintenance closet, this would be insufficient to sustain the verdict. As the trial 
court itself correctly noted: 
The fact that the Defendant may have covered the hole does 
not mean he engaged in criminal conduct. Repairing such a 
hole in one's own business is at least as consistent with 
lawful conduct as with criminal conduct. 
(Record, p. 338) (emphasis added). The trial court should thus have granted 
Defendant's motion for acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case in order to 
prevent the jury from making impermissible, speculative leaps across gaps in the 
evidence in order to convict Dr. Lyman. 
II 
DEFENDANT'S FELONY CONVICTION MUST BE REDUCED TO A 
MISDEMEANOR BECAUSE THE STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE 
OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ON THE 
DATE OF THE THEFT 
As set forth in Dr. Lyman's opening brief, evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the fair market value of the surveillance equipment on the date of the theft 
exceeded $1000 was required in order to sustain his felony conviction. This is 
particularly so where that element is the demarcation between a third degree felony 
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and a Class A misdemeanor. It is dispositive that there was no evidence whatsoever in 
this case that the fair market value of the stolen equipment exceeded $1,000 on April 6, 
1996. 
The State concedes that there was 'no direct evidence as to fair market value," 
(State's brief at 28), but argues that the jury could infer value as of April 6, 1996. This 
is flatly against the weight of legal authority. The cases cited by the State are not 
contextually persuasive, and none even remotely involve a case where the value is as 
close to the dividing line as in the case at bar. For example, in Bailey Countv Appraisal 
District v. Smallwood. 848 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App. 1993), the issue was valuation of real 
property for taxation purposes, which is entirely irrelevant to the standard of proof in a 
criminal case. In Dawson v. State. 360 So.2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the issue 
was whether the value exceeded $100, and the victim testified that the fair market 
value of the items stolen was $235. In Marini v. State. 351 A.2d 463 (Md. 1976), the 
issue was also whether the value exceeded $100, and the victim testified that the 
purchase price of the car was $2,800 and that he had recently purchased tires for the 
vehicle costing $120. 
The case of People v. Paris. 511 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1973), cited by the State, 
actually supports Dr. Lyman's position. The Court therein held that where the goods 
were three years old, the "purchase price could not reasonably be equated with the fair 
market value at the time of taking. In addition, the owner specifically stated on cross-
examination that he did not know the fair market value at the time of the commission of 
5 
the crime. Without any competent evidence of fair market value, the jury would have 
had to base its determination of the value of the goods in question at the critical time on 
pure speculation. The judge properly removed the case from the jury's consideration." 
i d at 894-95. 
To sustain a felony conviction, the State was required to present evidence of fair 
market value in excess of $1,000 on the date of the theft. In accordance with the cases 
cited in Defendant's opening brief, evidence of an aggregate purchase price alone in 
this case was not enough, nor was it permissible to allow the jury to speculate on value. 
The State's own brief demonstrates the legal flaw in its position. The State 
hypothesizes that "[e]ven if the jury found that the seven year-old VCR was worth only 
$100 on the day of the theft, that would still leave $157.72 of depreciation (or nearly 
13%) for the other nine items which were less than five months old." (State's Brief at 
31.) The problem, of course, is that the State just picked these numbers out of thin air. 
There was no evidence that the VCR was worth $100 or that the other items had 
depreciated less than 13%. Had the State provided such evidence, it may or may not 
have been reasonable for the jury to base a felony verdict on that evidence. Without 
any evidence of fair market value on the date of the theft, however, it was "not proper to 
leave a jury to the individual ideas of the jurors to determine value." Cannon v. State, 
578 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Ark. 1979). 
There is no dispute that the total purchase price of all the equipment was 
$1,257.73-barely over the critical $1,000 dividing line between a misdemeanor offense 
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and a felony offense. There is further no dispute that the VCR was nearly eight years 
old, and that the other items of significant value-the pinhole camera, variable focus 
lens and small monitor-were 8 months old.2 Most significantly, it is uncontroverted 
that the State's witness, Roy Houchen, testified that used equipment would have had a 
lesser value and that he did not know what the fair market value of the surveillance 
equipment was on the date of the theft. The State accordingly did not meet its burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the element of fair market value of property in 
excess of $1,000. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Defendant's opening brief, Dr. Lyman's 
conviction should be reversed, or, in the alternative, reduced to a misdemeanor. 
Dated this _2gj?Tday of July, 1998. 
CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON 
RODNEY G. SNOW 
NEIL A. KAPLAN 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
2
 The State argues, with reference for the first time on appeal to Utah's Uniform 
Commercial Code, that the date of purchase should be the date of payment. However, 
Roy Houchen clearly testified that the date of purchase for the pinhole camera, variable 
focus lens and small monitor was August 10, 1995. (Record, p. 1090.) The date of 
payment was irrelevant to the jury's determination. Thus, the State's "within five 
months argument" applies only to items with a de minimus initial value. 
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